U.S. corporations hold significant amounts of cash on their balance sheets, and these cash holdings have been justified in the existing empirical literature by transaction costs and precautionary motives. An additional explanation, considered in this study, is that U.S. multinational firms hold cash in their foreign subsidiaries because of the tax costs associated with repatriating foreign income. Consistent with this hypothesis, firms that face higher repatriation tax burdens hold higher levels of cash, hold this cash abroad, and hold this cash in affiliates that trigger high tax costs when repatriating earnings. Estimates indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the tax burden from repatriating foreign income is associated with a 7.9% increase in the ratio of cash to net assets. In addition, certain firms, specifically those that are less financially constrained domestically and those that are more technology intensive, exhibit a higher sensitivity of affiliate cash holdings to repatriation tax burdens.
billion, $23.2 billion, $23.1 billion, and $19.9 billion. This paper develops and tests the hypothesis that the magnitude of corporate cash holdings is, in part, a consequence of the tax incentives faced by U.S. multinational companies. The U.S. and many other countries tax the foreign income of their firms, but these taxes can be deferred until earnings are repatriated. As a result, U.S. multinational firms have an incentive to retain earnings abroad, and to a large extent, these firms hold these funds in cash.
The existing academic literature on cash holdings has paid little attention to the potential impact of the incentives created by taxes associated with repatriations. The earliest explanations offered by academic research were based on trade-offs motivated by transactions costs. These theories suggest that firms hold cash to avoid the cost of being short liquid assets. Baumol (1952) , Tobin (1956) , Meltzer (1963) , Miller and Orr (1966) , and Karni (1973) develop this argument. Building on this work, Mulligan (1997) finds evidence of economies of scale in cash holdings. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) provide evidence that the precautionary incentive to hold cash is increased when asymmetric information or agency costs make it difficult for firms to raise external capital and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2006) argue that recent increases in cash holdings can be explained by increases in the precautionary motives for holding cash. More recent work links changes in cash holdings to these motives. In particular, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) show that financially constrained firms increase cash holdings by larger amounts when cash flow is high, or, put differently, that constrained firms have a higher cash flow sensitivity of cash. In this paper we explore the possibility that the tax costs associated with repatriations contribute to the magnitude of cash holdings.
2 Generally speaking the U.S.
taxes the foreign operations of domestic firms and grants tax credits for foreign income taxes paid abroad. For most U.S. affiliates, these taxes are equal to the difference between foreign income taxes paid and tax payments that would be due if foreign earnings were taxed at the U.S. rate, and they can be deferred until earnings are repatriated. These tax burdens create incentives for U.S. multinationals to retain earnings abroad and, if they do not have attractive investment opportunities, to hold the retained earnings as cash.
Using a large sample of firms over the period 1982 to 2004, drawn from
Compustat, our analysis first considers if firms that face higher tax costs of repatriating earnings hold higher levels of cash. Next, since repatriation tax burdens should only influence cash held abroad, it is informative to study the effect of these tax costs on cash affiliates that face the higher tax costs associated with repatriating earnings hold higher levels of cash than other affiliates of the same firm. Finally, further analysis is conducted at the affiliate level to determine if certain kinds of firms exhibit levels of cash holdings that are particularly sensitive to repatriation tax burdens.
Smith, forthcoming; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, forthcoming; Kalcheva and Lins, 2006; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2006) , and the effect of cash on mergers and acquisitions and corporate performance (Harford, 1999; Mikkelson and Partch, 2003) .
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Our empirical work confirms results presented in the existing literature and yields four main findings on the relation between taxes and cash holdings. First, firms that incur higher tax costs when repatriating earnings hold more cash. Estimates predict that a one standard deviation increase in the tax costs associated with repatriations is associated with a 7.9% increase in the ratio of cash to net assets (defined as total assets minus cash).
This result is robust across a variety of measures for the repatriation tax burden and specifications that analyze levels of cash holdings as well as changes in cash holdings.
Second, repatriation tax burdens induce firms to hold more cash abroad. The median firm facing an above average repatriation tax burden holds 47% of its cash abroad, but the median firm facing a below average repatriation tax burden holds only 26% of its cash abroad. Measures of increased repatriation tax burdens derived from the BEA data are associated with increases in foreign cash holdings, but they are insignificant in explaining domestic cash holdings. Our tests therefore do not have sufficient power to conclude that these tax burdens reduce domestic cash holdings.
Third, affiliates that trigger high tax costs when repatriating earnings hold higher levels of cash than other affiliates of the same firm. Tests compare the cash holdings of incorporated affiliates to that of foreign branch affiliates, which are not separate legal entities from their parents. This comparison is enlightening because the earnings of branches are taxed by the U.S. as they are earned, not as they are repatriated. Therefore, multinationals do not have a tax incentive to retain earnings in the form of cash in branches located abroad. Our findings indicate that incorporated affiliates in lower tax jurisdictions have higher cash holdings but that affiliates that are organized as branches hold lower levels of cash that do not vary with host country tax rates. These results are robust to the inclusion of parent firm fixed effects that control for unobservable time invariant firm characteristics that might affect cash holdings.
Finally, certain types of firms exhibit distinctive sensitivities of affiliate cash holdings to repatriation tax burdens. Firms that are financially constrained domestically in the sense of having high levels of domestic leverage and below investment grade (or no) debt ratings are less likely to defer taxes associated with repatriations by holding cash abroad. Their affiliate cash holdings are low and are not related to host country tax rates in a statistically significant way. Technology intensive firms, however, appear to have 4 affiliate cash holdings that are particularly sensitive to the tax costs triggered by repatriations. Previous work suggests that these firms have more flexibility to shift profits to low tax locations (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006) , and this flexibility appears to increase the sensitivity of the cash holdings of the affiliates of these firms to host country tax rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides details about how the U.S. tax code applies to the foreign earnings of U.S. multinational firms and its implications for corporate cash holdings. Section III describes the data and defines the proxies for repatriation tax burdens used in the empirical tests. Section IV presents the empirical results, and Section V concludes.
Repatriation Tax Burdens and Cash Holdings
The U.S. tax code affects the incentives of firms to hold foreign earnings abroad or to repatriate them, and in addition, it influences the decision of whether investments in liquid securities should be made domestically or abroad. This section describes the tax rules that apply to the international activities of U.S. multinationals and explains their implications for corporate cash holdings.
Taxation of U.S. Multinationals
Nearly all countries tax the income of corporations that operate within their borders. In addition, the U.S. and other countries tax the foreign income of their residents. However, to avoid double taxation of foreign income, U.S. law grants tax credits for foreign income taxes paid abroad. U.S. multinationals are permitted to defer U.S. tax liabilities on certain foreign profits until they are repatriated. This deferral is available only on the profits of foreign affiliates that are separately incorporated in foreign countries. The profits of branches, which are unincorporated foreign affiliates, are taxed immediately by the U.S.
Generally speaking, the taxes due upon repatriation are equal to the difference between foreign income taxes paid and tax payments that would be due if earnings were 5 taxed at the U.S. rate. For example, if the U.S. tax rate is 35% and a U.S. multinational earns $100 abroad and pays $20 in host country income taxes, an additional $15 would be due in U.S. taxes when the earnings are repatriated. If foreign income taxes paid exceed the amount that would be due if earnings were taxed at the U.S. rate, then no additional taxes are due.
There are some important caveats to this generalization. First, the extent to which firms can avoid U.S. taxes through deferral is limited. Under the Subpart F provisions of the U.S. law certain kinds of income, classified as "passive income," are "deemed distributed" and therefore immediately taxable by the U.S. even if it is not repatriated.
Passive income includes interest income and dividends received from investment in securities. While firms have discretion in classifying foreign cash holdings as being necessary for their business operations and thus not subject to passive income tax treatment, considerations related to Subpart F provisions are salient when considering where firms should hold liquid, interest bearing securities.
It should also be noted that total U.S. tax obligations are determined by worldwide averaging. This approach allows firms that pay tax rates above the U.S. tax rate in a particular jurisdiction to use the foreign tax credits from this jurisdiction to shield income repatriated from low tax locations from U.S. taxation. However, these foreign tax credits cannot be used to reduce tax obligations related to income earned within the U.S. Firms that have total foreign tax payments that exceed the amount that would be due if U.S. tax rates were applied to total taxable foreign income are characterized as having excess foreign tax credits. Excess credits from one year can be used to reduce U.S. taxable income related to foreign earnings in either of two previous years or five subsequent years.
Other aspects of a firm's tax status may reduce payments required for U.S. tax obligations on foreign source income. Tax credits associated with net operating losses (or investment tax credits earned prior to their repeal) can be used to offset payments due on foreign source income. Generally speaking, firms that face the alternative minimum tax (AMT) also have lower repatriation costs than they would if they were to face regular 6 taxes as a consequence of the lower statutory rate applied under the AMT. 3 These considerations indicate the relevance of using a firm's marginal tax rate when considering the effects of tax incentives on aggregated repatriations from all affiliates to a parent.
Implications for Corporate Cash Holdings
Existing empirical evidence indicates that multinational firms are more likely to retain earnings in low tax jurisdictions. 4 Hines and Hubbard (1990) find that in a sample of U.S. multinational firms drawn from 1984 tax return data, a one percent decrease in the repatriation tax is associated with a four percent increase in dividend payments by foreign subsidiaries. Similarly, Grubert (1998) and Grubert and Mutti (2001), using 1990 and 1992 tax return data, find that repatriations are sensitive to tax considerations. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2001, forthcoming) find that affiliates of U.S. multinationals located in low tax jurisdictions have lower dividend payout ratios. Specifically, the payout ratios of incorporated affiliates vary with host country tax rates, but the payout ratios of branches do not.
Furthermore, despite the tax treatment of passive income, firms choosing to invest earnings from a low tax foreign jurisdiction in cash either at home or in the low tax jurisdiction often have an incentive to hold this cash in the low tax jurisdiction. To illustrate this point, consider the case of an incorporated affiliate that earned $100 and pays $20 in foreign income taxes. If the firm repatriates these earnings immediately, it pays an additional $15 in U.S. taxes and then can invest the remaining $65 in the liquid security. Any earnings associated with this investment are taxed at the U.S. rate.
However, if the firm does not repatriate the earnings, it will be able to invest $80 in the liquid security. While Subpart F regulations require the firm to pay U.S. taxes on 7 earnings associated with this investment, the firm will be better off holding cash abroad because by doing so it defers the repatriation taxes on the original $100 of earnings which are active earnings. If affiliates produce goods that make use of intangible property developed by the U.S.
parent, tax law requires the affiliate to make a royalty payment to the parent that reflects 5 An extensive literature indicates that multinationals are able to shift profits to low tax jurisdictions. This literature analyzes patterns of reported profitability and intrafirm trade of U.S. multinational firms. See, for example, Grubert and Mutti (1991) ; Harris, Morck, Slemrod and Yeung (1993) ; Klassen, Lang and Wolfson (1993) ; Hines and Rice (1994) ; Collins, Kemsley, and Lang (1998); Clausing (2001); and Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004a) ; this literature is critically reviewed in Hines (1999) . Some low-tax jurisdictions are so valuable to multinationals from a tax avoidance standpoint that they have been identified by the IRS and other sources as being "tax havens. " Desai, Foley, Hines (2006) analyzes the use of havens by U.S. multinationals and finds that nearly 60% of U.S. firms with substantial foreign operations had an affiliate presence in a tax-haven country.
8 that market value of the intangible property and that covers some of the fixed costs of producing it, but tax authorities find it particularly difficult to assess if firms assign fair values in these cases. Similarly, when an affiliate buys a good produced by the parent to distribute it elsewhere, it is supposed to pay a transfer price that would be paid by unrelated parties, but these transfer prices can also be difficult to assess. As a consequence, technology intensive firms are likely to have higher levels of retained earnings held as cash and to exhibit a higher sensitivity of affiliate cash holdings to host country tax rates. This argument suggests that the observed tendency of R&D intensive firms to hold cash may be generated from tax considerations rather than the precautionary or transactions costs motivations discussed in the existing literature.
While these arguments predict that repatriation tax burdens will affect corporate cash holdings, the tax on repatriated earnings may have no effect on cash balances for a variety of reasons. First, even if the tax law leads firms to retain earnings in their overseas subsidiaries, firms may increase investment rather than cash holdings. 6 Second, if firms target an overall cash balance, they may hold less cash in the U.S. to offset the cash they view as trapped overseas. Third, firms have various tax avoidance strategies at their disposal, and they may use them to make repatriation taxes irrelevant. For example, affiliates in low tax environments can lend to or invest in another foreign affiliate. When an affiliate buys the equity of another affiliate that was owned by the parent, the firm can return cash to the U.S. without triggering repatriation taxes. If these kinds of strategies are effective and not too costly, one would find no relation between firms' cash holdings and their tax costs due to repatriation. These possibilities form the basis for our null hypothesis of no relation between taxes and cash holdings. 6 As discussed in Section 2, U.S. tax law contains provisions designed to encourage re-investment of earnings rather than holding cash. These provisions prevent U.S. multinational firms from deferring the taxes due on earnings of passive investments like interest and dividends received from investments in securities. Passive income is deemed distributed, and therefore immediately taxable in the U.S., even if not repatriated as dividend payments. Earnings reinvested in active business operations are not subject to these provisions.
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Data
The data used in the analysis below are drawn from two primary sources. This section begins by describing these two sources and the measures of cash holdings that are computed using them. Then it explains in detail how proxies for the tax burden of repatriations are calculated. The analyses presented in Tables 2 and 3 are therefore conducted using two samples that are constructed making distinct assumptions-one sample is generated without adjusting 7 To reduce the potential impact of outliers we winsorize this variable at the 1% level in each tail of the distribution. Even though most of our other independent variables are also calculated as ratios, upon inspection they are not subject to outlier problems. 8 Opler et al. (1999) estimate both industry and firm-level cash flow standard deviation using the previous twenty years. Limitations on the duration of our sample prevent us from adopting the same approach; rather, we estimate a contemporaneous standard deviation over the full sample period. To obtain crosssectional variation, we construct this at the firm level. 9 Security and Exchange Commission regulations stipulate that firms should separately report foreign activities in each year that foreign assets or revenues or income exceed 10% of total activities. These regulations also require firms to report foreign income taxes if these exceed 5% of total income before taxes.
Cash Holdings and Multinational Activity
the raw data and the other is generated assuming that missing values of foreign income and taxes are equal to zero, as would be the case if firms with missing values were purely domestic firms without foreign operations.
In our tests, we recognize that firms with more foreign income, all else equal, may hold more cash, even in the absence of our tax effect. First, a delay between when the cash from earnings is received and when it is used generates a mechanical positive relation between cash holdings and income. Second, firms with more foreign businesses may require more precautionary cash holdings if investment opportunities abroad are greater or more volatile than domestic opportunities, or alternatively, if raising capital for foreign operations is more difficult. To control for these effects, we include the ratios of pre-tax foreign and domestic income to total assets, Foreign Income/Total Assets and Domestic Income/Total Assets, in our regression tests. The first panel of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all of the variables that are computed from Compustat data and used in the analysis below.
[ Table 1 about here]
More detailed data on multinationals are drawn from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) annual survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad. These data provide a panel of data on the financial and operating characteristics of U.S. multinational firms operating abroad. U.S. direct investment abroad is defined as the direct or indirect ownership or control by a single U.S. legal entity of at least ten percent of the voting securities of an incorporated foreign business enterprise or the equivalent interest in an unincorporated foreign business enterprise. A U.S. multinational entity is the combination of a single U.S. legal entity that has made the direct investment, called the U.S. parent, and at least one foreign business enterprise, called the foreign affiliate. As a result of confidentiality assurances and penalties for noncompliance, BEA believes that coverage is close to complete and levels of accuracy are high.
The survey forms that U.S. multinational enterprises are required to complete cover both domestic and foreign operations, and they vary depending on the year, the size of the affiliate, and the U.S. parent's percentage of ownership of an affiliate. Although many data items like net income and assets are collected for a broad sample on an annual basis, data on cash holdings are only available for larger affiliates and their parents in 1982, 1989, 1994, and 1999 , when BEA conducted benchmark surveys. In these years, surveys captured information on the cash holdings of individual subsidiaries located in different countries and the domestic cash holdings of U.S. multinationals. 10 Cash is defined to include deposits in financial institutions and other cash items. In order to analyze the BEA data in conjunction with Compustat data these data sets are merged using IRS issued employer identification numbers.
In addition to providing information on cash holdings in distinct locations, the BEA data are also the source of the detailed controls used in the analysis of affiliate cash holdings. The controls include identifiers indicating if individual affiliates are organized as branches and therefore subject to unique tax treatment. They also provide domestic parent and affiliate level data on the scale of operations, R&D expenditures, capital expenditures, leverage, and returns. 11 These variables are used to control for factors that affect cash holdings through alternative channels than the channel of repatriation taxes.
The bottom panel of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables constructed using the BEA data.
The Tax Burden of Repatriations
Ideally, in order to identify the impact of repatriation taxes on cash holdings, one would like to know if affiliates are organized as branches, the value of accumulated foreign affiliate earnings, and the tax costs of repatriating these accumulated earnings.
Large sample systematic data on these items are not available, so it is necessary to employ proxies and conduct a variety of indirect tests.
12 10 In 1982 10 In , 1989 10 In , and 1994 affiliates with an absolute value of sales, assets, or net income in excess of $3, $15, and $50 million respectively and their parents were required to report cash holdings. In 1999, all majority owned affiliates and parents with an absolute value of sales, assets, or net income in excess of $100 million were required to report cash holdings. The BEA data include detailed information about where firms have foreign operations, so it is possible to use these data in conjunction with data on subsidiary host country tax rates to compute the effective tax rate a firm would face if it were to data on earnings retained abroad and classified as permanently reinvested for 267 firms and shows that this designation is used to manage earnings. Collins, Hand, and Shackelford (2001) collect permanently reinvented earnings data on 340 firms and study how the market values these earnings.
14 repatriate its earnings. The Effective Repatriation Tax Rate is computed by first taking the maximum of zero and the difference between the weighted foreign tax rate a firm faces and its marginal effective tax rate as calculated in Graham (1996b) , and then multiplying this value by the share of firm activity that is generated abroad. Assets and other accounting items do not provide clean bases for weighting tax rates and computing the share of firm activity abroad because of potential double counting problems. For example, part of a subsidiary's assets is financed by equity invested by the parent, which appears as an asset on a parent's balance sheet. Therefore, the analysis employs two variables for weighting and computing shares that are not subject to double counting: net property plant and equipment and employment.
Unlike the Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings variable, the Effective Repatriation
Tax Rate is not based on a single year of foreign earnings. It is related to stocks of firm activity, and therefore it is reasonable to analyze how it affects levels of cash holdings.
In addition, because the BEA data on parent and subsidiary cash holdings are not collected on an annual basis, it is not possible to study changes in parent and subsidiary cash. The Effective Repatriation Tax Rate is an appropriate measure of the repatriation tax burden if accumulated earnings are proportional to the level of firm activity in distinct jurisdictions. Accumulated earnings may, however, be higher in low tax locations, reflecting the incentives of multinationals to engage in transfer pricing. 13 The Tax Costs of Repatriating Earnings proxy for the repatriation tax burden is not subject to this concern because it is computed using measures of foreign income. The Alternative Effective Repatriation Tax Rate variables are computed using U.S. statutory tax rates in place of marginal tax rates. Descriptive statistics for all the proxies for the repatriation tax burden appear in Table 1 . Fig. 1 presents the median ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated total assets less consolidated cash holdings for firms that face above and below average Effective Repatriation Tax Rates. As is evident from the figure, firms facing higher repatriation tax burdens hold more cash. The median firm facing above average effective 13 The Effective Repatriation Tax Rate might be a poor proxy for the tax burden of repatriation if levels of affiliate activity do not indicate levels of accumulated earnings because of differences in affiliate age. Robustness tests address this possibility. This proxy is also imperfect if foreign tax rates differ from those charged when accumulated earnings are taxed. The analysis of changes in cash holdings below is not subject to this concern.
15 repatriation tax rates holds 6.7% of net assets in cash, while the median firm facing below average effective repatriation tax rates holds only 4.6% of net assets in cash. While illustrative, the comparison in Fig. 1 does not control for a variety of other factors that have been shown to affect cash holdings. The analysis in the next section attempts to do so.
[ Fig. 1 about here]
Results
The analysis in this section first considers the effects of repatriation tax burdens on consolidated cash holdings. Then it explores the extent to which these tax costs affect foreign and domestic cash holdings. Finally, it studies the effects of these costs on the cash holdings of individual affiliates of the same firm and conducts tests that reveal if certain types of firms exhibit distinctive response to repatriation tax costs. Table 2 presents the results of specifications that include the above mentioned proxies for the precautionary motives that were considered in Opler et al. (1999) along with proxies for the repatriation tax burden. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated total assets less consolidated cash holdings. 14 Each specification includes fixed effects for each industry (using two-digit SIC codes) and each year. The sample used in columns 1 and 3 covers all Compustat firms, assuming that firms that do not report foreign income or foreign 14 Similar results are obtained if instead the dependent variable is computed as the natural logarithm of one plus the ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated total assets less consolidated cash holdings, which would mitigate the effect of taking the log of ratios that are very close to zero. Similar results are also obtained if one addresses outliers by winsorizing the ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated total assets less consolidated cash holdings at the 1% level in each tail of the distribution.
Consolidated Cash Holdings
income taxes do not have foreign income or pay foreign taxes, and the sample used in columns 2 and 4 includes only those firms that report foreign income and foreign taxes.
15
[ Table 3 analyze marginal changes in cash over a single year, using the change in the ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated total assets less consolidated cash holdings. 16 As in Table 2 , all the specifications include industry and year fixed effects, and the first and third specifications are run on samples that include all Compustat firms and the second and fourth are run on samples of just firms reporting foreign pretax income and foreign income taxes.
[ Table 3 about here]
The coefficients on the Tax Table 3 is therefore very similar to the economic significance of the results presented in Table 2 . The results presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 show that proxies for repatriation tax burdens that use U.S. statutory rates instead of U.S. marginal tax rates are also positive and significantly related to changes in cash holdings.
The BEA data include detailed information on where firms have foreign operations, so it is possible to use data on subsidiary host country tax rates to compute an alternative proxy for repatriation tax burdens, the Effective Repatriation Tax Rate. [ Table 4 about here]
The positive and significant coefficient on the Effective Repatriation Tax Table 4 , the controls have effects that are very similar to the effects estimated in Table 2 .
Taken together, Tables 2, 3 , and 4 present consistent evidence that the tax costs of repatriating foreign earnings significantly increase consolidated cash holdings. This finding appears in our analysis of the levels of cash holdings as well as changes in cash holdings, and it is robust across a variety of measures of the tax burden of repatriations.
Domestic and foreign cash holdings
If repatriation tax burdens increase cash holdings, they should increase cash held abroad, and if cash held abroad substitutes for cash held domestically, then higher repatriation tax burdens could reduce domestic cash holdings. The results in Tables 2, 3, 17 As noted in footnote 13, the Effective Repatriation Tax Rate might be a poor proxy for the tax burden of repatriation if levels of affiliate activity do not indicate levels of accumulated earnings because of differences in affiliate age. To consider this possibility, specifications that include average affiliate age and average affiliate age interacted with measures of effective repatriation tax rates are included in the specifications presented in Table 4 . The coefficients on these variables are not significant, and their inclusion does not change the size or significance of coefficients on the effective repatriation tax rates in a meaningful way.
and 4 indicate that repatriation tax costs increase consolidated cash holdings, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis that U.S. cash reductions completely offset higher foreign cash holdings. The data shown in Fig. 2 and the specifications presented in Tables 5 and 6 shed further light on these hypotheses. Fig. 2 shows the median share of cash held abroad by U.S. multinationals that face above and below average effective repatriation tax rates, computed using net PPE weights. The median firm facing above average rates holds 47% of its cash abroad, but the median firm facing below average rates holds only 26% of its cash abroad. This figure suggests that repatriation tax burdens increase foreign cash holdings relative to domestic cash holdings. Tables 5 and 6 present results of studying the effects of repatriation tax burdens on cash holdings in each of these locations in a regression framework.
[ Fig. 2 about here]
[ Table 5 about here]
The specifications presented in Tables 5 and 6 are identical to those presented in Table 4 , except the numerator of the dependent variable is foreign cash holdings for the analysis presented in Table 5 and domestic cash holdings for the analysis presented in Table 6 . The sample used for these tests is the subset of observations that appear in both
Compustat and the BEA data that report both domestic and foreign cash holdings. 18 In Table 5 , the coefficients on the effective repatriation tax rate variables are all positive, statistically significant, and larger in magnitude than the coefficients on these variables in Table 4 . In fact, each measure of effective tax rates has an effect on foreign cash holdings that is more than twice as large as its effect on consolidated cash holdings. The 8.0815 coefficient in column 1 of Table 5 implies that a one standard deviation increase in the Effective Repatriation Tax Rate (Net PPE Weighted) is associated with a 12% increase in the ratio of foreign cash holdings to net assets. Thus, repatriation tax burdens appear to affect where the cash is held.
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[ Table 6 about here]
The tests presented in Table 6 estimate the effect of repatriation tax burdens on domestic cash holdings. Although the point estimates of the coefficients on the effective repatriation tax rate variables are all negative, which is consistent with lower U.S. cash holdings offsetting higher foreign cash holdings, they are not statistically significant. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude that firms facing higher tax costs of repatriation hold less cash domestically. Several factors limit the extent to which cash held abroad can substitute for cash held domestically. As a consequence of the tax costs of repatriations and the limits on other methods of relocating cash to the U.S., foreign retained earnings are costly to access. In addition, capital providers to the domestic operations of a multinational are skeptical about the extent to which cash held abroad is a pledgeable asset because of the territorial nature of bankruptcy law. There is a remarkable void in the laws governing multinational bankruptcies, but respect for the laws of the country in which a firm is operating implies that local bankruptcy rules apply to the resolution of insolvency proceedings involving a multinational affiliate and that lenders to the U.S. parent may have trouble obtaining assets held abroad. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003) offers a detailed discussion of the workings of multinational bankruptcies and the reasons why local laws should dictate the bankruptcy terms of multinational affiliates. Additionally, Bebchuk and Guzman (1999) provide a useful analysis of the tension between local and universal principles for multinational bankruptcies with particular reference to the United States, and Tagashira (1994), Gitlin and Flaschen (1987) , and Powers (1994) discuss various efforts at international bankruptcy cooperation and their shortcomings.
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and often statistically insignificant effects on foreign cash holdings. The estimates of the coefficients on these variables may simply reflect the relatively large importance of domestic activity for most firms.
The coefficients on R&D Expenditures/Total Assets are positive and significant in both Tables 5 and 6, illustrating that R&D intensive firms hold more cash both abroad and at home. These results suggest that the high cash holdings of these firms are at least partially tax motivated. Previous work interprets the effects of R&D expenditures on cash holdings as indicating that firms with higher costs of obtaining external finance hold more cash for precautionary reasons. However, because the average U.S. multinational firm in the sample conducts 89.8% of its R&D in the U.S., the precautionary motive is likely to result in high domestic, not foreign, cash holdings. The effects of R&D on foreign cash holdings is consistent with the hypothesis that R&D intensive firms are better able to shift profits to low tax foreign locations. This hypothesis is analyzed in more detail in the next section.
Affiliate cash holdings
The results in Tables 2-6 show that firms facing higher repatriation tax burdens hold more cash and that repatriation tax burdens specifically affect the level of cash held abroad. The analysis presented in Tables 7 and 8 looks across affiliates and explores if firms hold more cash in foreign locations from which it is very costly to repatriate earnings. In addition, our tests consider whether financial constraints limit the ability of firms to avoid repatriation tax burdens and if, given their ability to relocate profits, technology intensive firms have cash holdings that are particularly sensitive to repatriation tax burdens.
The effect of taxes
Individual affiliates face tax costs of repatriation that vary inversely with their host country tax rates. These tax costs are not relevant to branch affiliates as the U.S.
taxes the foreign income of these affiliates as it is earned, not as earnings are repatriated.
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The specifications presented in Table 7 regress affiliate level cash holdings on measures of the affiliate's host country tax rate, a dummy equal to one for affiliates organized as branches and zero otherwise, and a set of controls. The dependent variable in these specifications is the natural logarithm of the ratio of affiliate cash holdings to affiliate total assets less affiliate cash holdings. The sample includes all affiliates that report cash holdings. The specifications in columns 1 and 2 include fixed effects for each three digit BEA industry code and each year, and those in columns 3 and 4 include fixed effects for each parent firm and each year.
[ Table 7 
The effect of taxes for financially constrained and technology intensive firms
We also examine whether the sensitivities of cash holdings to repatriation tax burdens affect different firms differently. If a firm is financially constrained domestically, it may not be able to defer taxes due on foreign earnings by holding these earnings abroad. The specifications presented in columns 1 and 2 of 
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Technology intensive firms may find it easier than other firms to satisfy the requirements of international tax authorities while shifting profits to low tax jurisdictions.
These firms may recognize larger profits in low tax jurisdictions and hold more cash in these jurisdictions than other firms. As a consequence, affiliates of technology intensive firms may exhibit a higher sensitivity of cash holdings to host country tax rates than affiliates of other firms. To test this possibility, the specifications in columns 3 and 4 of Assets from zero by one standard deviation changes the sensitivity of affiliate cash holdings to country tax rates by -0.7048, or nearly doubles the sensitivity of affiliate cash holdings to host country tax rates. In other words, technology intensive firms appear to be particularly sensitive to repatriation tax burdens.
Conclusion
Understanding the extent to which firms hold cash has been a part of the academic research agenda in finance for more than fifty years. Much of the work in this field emphasizes transactions costs, the difficulties associated with obtaining external finance, and agency considerations. This study indicates that taxes also have significant effects on the cash balances of U.S. firms.
We find that U.S. multinational firms that would trigger larger tax expenses by repatriating earnings have higher consolidated cash holdings. Analysis of detailed data on the domestic and foreign operations of these firms shows that repatriation tax burdens increase cash held abroad and that these higher foreign cash holdings are not directly Tax Rate is computed by first taking the maximum of zero and the difference between the weighted foreign tax rate a firm faces and its marginal effective tax rate as calculated in Graham (1996b) . Then this value is multiplied by the share of firm activity abroad. Weighted foreign tax rates are computed using net property plant and equipment in each country as weights and the share of net property plant and equipment abroad as the share of firm activity abroad. Graham (1996b) . Then this value is multiplied by the share of firm activity abroad. Weighted foreign tax rates are computed using net property plant and equipment in each country as weights and the share of net property plant and equipment abroad as the share of firm activity abroad. zero and the difference between the weighted foreign tax rate a firm faces and its marginal effective tax rate as calculated in Graham (1996b) . Then this value is multiplied by the share of firm activity abroad. For Net PPE weighted measures, weighted foreign tax rates are computed using net property plant and equipment in each country as weights and the share of net property plant and equipment abroad as the share of firm activity abroad. Employment weighted measures use employment in place of Net PPE. Alternative Effective Repatriation Tax Rates are computed similarly, but U.S. statutory tax rates are used in place of marginal tax rates. Country Tax Rate is the annual median income tax rate paid by affiliates in a particular host country. Branch Dummy takes a value of one if the affiliate is organized as a branch and zero otherwise. Affiliate Net Income/Affiliate Assets is the ratio of affiliate net income to affiliate assets. Log of Affiliate Assets is the natural logarithm of affiliate assets. Standard Deviation of Affiliate Net Income/Affiliate Assets is the standard deviation of the ratio of affiliate net income to affiliate assets measured over the entire 1982-1999 period using annual data. Domestic R&D/Domestic Assets is the ratio of domestic R&D expenditures to domestic assets, and Affiliate R&D/Affiliate Assets is the ratio of affiliate R&D expenditures affiliate assets. Affiliate Capital Expenditures/Affiliate Assets is the ratio of affiliate capital expenditures to affiliate assets. Affiliate Leverage is the ratio of affiliate current liabilities and long term debt to affiliate assets. Financial Constraint Dummy is a dummy equal to one if the firm's domestic leverage is above the sample median and the firm has a below investment grade debt rating or has no debt rating and zero otherwise. Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
The top panel of this table provides descriptive statistics for variables computed using Compustat data and the bottom panel for variables computed using BEA data. Ln(Cash/Net Assets) is the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash to total assets less cash. Change in Cash/Net Assets is the first difference in the ratio of cash to total assets less cash. The Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings is computed by first subtracting foreign taxes paid from the product of a firm's foreign pretax income and its marginal effective tax rate as calculated in Graham (2000) . Then the maximum of this difference or zero is scaled by total firm assets. This table presents estimated coefficients from regressions explaining a firm's cash holdings as a function of the tax costs of repatriating earnings, along with other variables. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash to total assets less cash. The Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings is computed by first subtracting foreign taxes paid from the product of a firm's foreign pretax income and its marginal effective tax rate as calculated in Graham (1996b) . Then the maximum of this difference or zero is scaled by total firm assets. The Alternative Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings is computed similarly, but U.S. statutory tax rates are used in place of marginal tax rates. Domestic Income/Total Assets and Foreign Income/Total Assets are ratios of domestic and foreign pretax income to total assets, respectively. Log of Assets is the natural logarithm of total firm assets. Dividend Dummy is a dummy equal to one if the firm pays cash dividends and zero otherwise. Book Value of Equity/Market Value of Equity is the ratio of the book value of common equity to the market value of common equity. Standard Deviation of Operating Income is the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets, measured by firm over the entire sample period. R&D Expenditures/Total Assets and Capital Expenditures/Total Assets are ratios of research and development expenditures and capital expenditures to total assets, respectively. Market leverage is the ratio of long and short term debt to the sum of long and short term debt and the market value of equity. Each specification includes industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors that correct for clustering of errors by firm are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Cash Holdings and Tax Costs of Repatriating Earnings
Dependent Variable: This table presents estimated coefficients from regressions explaining a firm's cash holdings as a function of the tax costs of repatriating earnings, along with other variables. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash to total assets less cash. The Effective Repatriation Tax Rate is computed by first taking the maximum of zero and the difference between the weighted foreign tax rate a firm faces and its marginal effective tax rate as calculated in Graham (1996b) . Then this value is multiplied by the share of firm activity abroad. For Net PPE weighted measures, weighted foreign tax rates are computed using net property plant and equipment in each country as weights and the share of net property plant and equipment abroad as the share of firm activity abroad. Employment weighted measures use employment in place of Net PPE. Alternative Effective Repatriation Tax Rates are computed similarly, but U.S. statutory tax rates are used in place of marginal tax rates. Domestic Income/Total Assets and Foreign Income/Total Assets are ratios of domestic and foreign pretax income to total assets, respectively. Log of Assets is the natural logarithm of total firm assets. Dividend Dummy is a dummy equal to one if the firm pays cash dividends and zero otherwise. Book Value of Equity/Market Value of Equity is the ratio of the book value of common equity to the market value of common equity. Standard Deviation of Operating Income is the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets, measured by firm over the entire sample period. R&D Expenditures/Total Assets and Capital Expenditures/Total Assets are ratios of research and development expenditures and capital expenditures to total assets, respectively. Market leverage is the ratio of long and short term debt to the sum of long and short term debt and the market value of equity. Each specification includes industry and yea fixed effects. Standard errors that correct for clustering of errors by firm are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. This table presents estimated coefficients from regressions explaining a firm's foreign cash holdings as a function of the tax costs of repatriating earnings, along with other variables. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash held abroad to total assets less total cash. The Effective Repatriation Tax Rate is computed by first taking the maximum of zero and the difference between the weighted foreign tax rate a firm faces and its marginal effective tax rate as calculated in Graham (1996b) . Then this value is multiplied by the share of firm activity abroad. For Net PPE weighted measures, weighted foreign tax rates are computed using net property plant and equipment in each country as weights and the share of net property plant and equipment abroad as the share of firm activity abroad. Employment weighted measures use employment in place of Net PPE. Alternative Effective Repatriation Tax Rates are computed similarly, but U.S. statutory tax rates are used in place of marginal tax rates Domestic Income/Total Assets and Foreign Income/Total Assets are ratios of domestic and foreign pretax income to total assets, respectively. Log of Assets is the natural logarithm of total firm assets. Dividend Dummy is a dummy equal to one if the firm pays cash dividends and zero otherwise. Book Value of Equity/Market Value of Equity is the ratio of the book value of common equity to the market value of common equity. Standard Deviation of Operating Income is the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets, measured by firm over the entire sample period. R&D Expenditures/Total Assets and Capital Expenditures/Total Assets are ratios of research and development expenditures and capital expenditures to total assets, respectively. Market leverage is the ratio of long and short term debt to the sum of long and short term debt and the market value of equity. Each specification includes industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors that correct for clustering of errors by firm are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. This table presents estimated coefficients from regressions explaining a firm's domestic cash holdings as a function of the tax costs of repatriating earnings, along with other variables. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash held domestically to total assets less total cash. The Effective Repatriation Tax Rate is computed by first taking the maximum of zero and the difference between the weighted foreign tax rate a firm faces and its marginal effective tax rate as calculated in Graham (1996b) . Then this value is multiplied by the share of firm activity abroad. For Net PPE weighted measures, weighted foreign tax rates are computed using net property plant and equipment in each country as weights and the share of ne property plant and equipment abroad as the share of firm activity abroad. Employment weighted measures use employment in place of Net PPE. Alternative Effective Repatriation Tax Rates are computed similarly, but U.S. statutory tax rates are used in place of marginal tax rates. Domestic Income/Total Assets and Foreign Income/Total Assets are ratios of domestic and foreign pretax income to total assets, respectively. Log of Assets is the natural logarithm of total firm assets. Dividend Dummy is a dummy equal to one if the firm pays cash dividends and zero otherwise. Book Value of Equity/Market Value of Equity is the ratio of the book value of common equity to the market value of common equity. Standard Deviation of Operating Income is the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets, measured by firm over the entire sample period. R&D Expenditures/Total Assets and Capital Expenditures/Total Assets are ratios of research and development expenditures and capital expenditures to total assets, respectively. Market leverage is the ratio of long and short term debt to the sum of long and short term debt and the market value of equity. Each specification includes industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors that correct for clustering of errors by firm are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
